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A CONSENT DECREE ABROAD: 
EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
AN EPA CONSENT DECREE IN UNITED 
STATES v. VOLVO POWERTRAIN CORP. 
MARC C. PALMER* 
Abstract: Although not as prominent in the public eye as automobile engines, 
emissions from non-road engines contribute significantly to global air pollution.  
In 2005, the United States Government fined Volvo Powertrain Corp. seventy-
two million dollars for manufacturing non-road engines at its foreign subsidiary 
because these engines were not in compliance with emissions standards and 
therefore violated a consent decree between Volvo Powertrain Corp. and the 
federal government. In United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld an interpretation of the con-
sent decree and financial penalty put forth by the lower court. This Comment 
argues that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in holding Volvo 
Powertrain liable for the emissions violations of its subsidiaries’ engines. Volvo 
Powertrain subjected itself to United States jurisdiction by requesting certifi-
cates of emissions compliance from the Environmental Protection Agency for 
the engines manufactured abroad by their foreign subsidiary. 
INTRODUCTION 
A strong link exists between air pollution and human mortality.1 This 
increased mortality risk was first discovered in the landmark Harvard Uni-
versity Six City study and is quantified as a two-to-three-year shorter life 
span, due mostly to exposure to fine particulate concentrations.2 In the years 
following this study, more stringent Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) regulations have consistently driven down fine particulate concentra-
tions across the United States.3 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017. 
 1 Laren Feldscher, Landmark Air Pollution Study Turns 20, HARV. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, https://
www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/six-cities-air-pollution-study-turns-20/ [https://perma.cc/65C4-
PWM3]. 
 2 Id. Fine particulate concentrations mean particles smaller than 2.5 microns in diameter. Id. 
 3 Id. The six cities were selected at random, and included Watertown, Massachusetts; Harri-
man, Tennessee; specific census tracts of St. Louis, Missouri; Steubenville, Ohio; Portage, Wis-
consin; and Topeka, Kansas. Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution 
and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1754 (1993). In 2011, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”) estimated that its control of particulate air pollution saved 
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Despite the significant strides in emission reductions from stricter reg-
ulation, engine and automobile manufacturers have violated these regula-
tions.4 Most widely publicized was the recent Volkswagen diesel emissions 
scandal, in which Volkswagen intentionally equipped vehicles with software 
designed to subvert emissions tests.5 While road vehicles are key contribu-
tors to global air pollution, a significant amount of air pollution stems from 
non-road engines and non-road vehicles.6 
In 1998, the EPA alleged that several engine manufacturers violated 
the Clean Air Act by installing defeat devices on engines intended for emis-
sions testing.7 Defeat devices suppress emissions readings, allowing en-
gines producing exhaust over the EPA limit to pass emissions tests.8 The 
manufacturers settled with the United States, and each manufacturer agreed 
to enter into a consent decree.9 The consent decrees included a provision 
called the “non-road engine pull-ahead” that required the manufacturers to 
satisfy future EPA emissions standards ahead of schedule (i.e. in 2005 the 
manufacturers had to meet 2006 targets) for nitrogen oxide (“NOx”).10 Vol-
vo Powertrain Corp. (“Volvo Powertrain”) was one of the manufacturers 
that entered into such a decree with the Government.11 
In September 2005, following an anonymous tip from a competitor in 
the marketplace, federal officials began an investigation of non-road engines 
manufactured by Volvo Penta, a foreign subsidiary of Volvo Powertrain based 
in Poland.12 The investigation revealed that the engines did not meet the con-
                                                                                                                           
160,000 lives in 2010 alone, and that regulations will save 230,000 lives per annum by 2020. Id.; 
Feldscher, supra note 1. 
 4 Guilbert Gates et al., Explaining Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2017), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-
explained.html [https://perma.cc/XZ4H-7Y25]. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/8-90/057F, HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 
DIESEL ENGINE EXHAUST 1–2 (2002) [hereinafter HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT]. Data from 
1998 indicates that diesel exhaust contributed to six percent of the total ambient two point five 
micron fine particulate matter. Id. 
 7 United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp. (Volvo II), 758 F.3d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2014). A 
“defeat device” is a device employed by an automobile manufacturer intended to circumvent a 
federal or state emissions test. See 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(b) (2012). 
 8 Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 333. 
 9 Id. at 334. A consent decree is a court decree that all parties agree to. Consent Decree, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 10 Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 334. This agreement, called the non-road engine pull-ahead, was a key 
component to the EPA strategy of aggressively pursuing emissions reductions. Id. at 335. Nitrogen 
Oxide was the main target of the non-road pull-ahead as it is the prime contributor to harmful air 
pollution. Id. 
 11 Id. at 334. 
 12 Id. at 334, 336. The terms “non-road engines” and “non-road vehicles” are broad and define a 
variety of equipment. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 12A-2001, NONROAD ENGINE AND VEHICLE EMIS-
SION STUDY-REPORT, at i, v (1991). These terms can even apply to small equipment like lawnmow-
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sent decree requirements entered into by Volvo Powertrain and the Govern-
ment in 2005.13 Even though the engines were not manufactured in the Unit-
ed States, or marketed for sale therein, the Government sent a letter demand-
ing approximately seventy two million dollars in penalties and interest.14 
Volvo Powertrain filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, seeking judicial review of the Government’s demand 
letter.15 The District Court entered a judgment for seventy two million dollars 
against Volvo Powertrain.16 The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp., as-
sessed the District Court’s conclusions de novo.17 The D.C. Circuit upheld the 
District Court’s decision, and ordered enforcement of the payment.18 In June 
of 2015, the United States Supreme Court rejected a petition for certiorari 
filed by Volvo Powertrain thereby refusing to review the decision of the lower 
court.19 
This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit appropriately interpreted the 
consent decree by requiring Volvo Powertrain to pay a civil penalty for certi-
fying engines that did not meet emissions standards.20 The Comment reasons 
that the determination of the financial penalty was correctly upheld pursuant 
to the court’s equitable discretion.21 In addition, this Comment argues that 
this case highlights the reach of the EPA and its regulations not only to do-
mestic manufacturers, but also to manufacturers and their operations 
abroad.22 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1998, the United States brought enforcement actions against several 
truck engine manufacturers, alleging that the fuel injection systems used in 
                                                                                                                           
ers and chains saws, recreational equipment, farm equipment and construction machinery. Id. It is 
important to note that locomotives and aircraft are not included in the characterization of “non-
road engines and “non-road vehicles” as the Clean Air Act provides for them separately. Id. at v 
n.11. Volvo Truck Corp. later went through a corporate transition and became Volvo Powertrain 
Corp. Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 339. 
 13 Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 336–37. 
 14 Id. at 337. 
 15 United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp. (Volvo I), 854 F. Supp. 2d 60, 64 (D.D.C. 2012), 
aff’d, 758 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 16 Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 337, 343. 
 17 Id. at 337. The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had previously held that 
the proper standard of review of a District Court’s interpretation of a consent decree is de novo 
review. Nix v. Billington, 448 F.3d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 18 Volvo II. 758 F.3d at 334. 
 19 Volvo Powertrain Corp. v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2833 (2015) (mem.). 
 20 See infra notes 75–107 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 75–107 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 75–107 and accompanying text. 
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these truck engines violated the Clean Air Act.23 The truck engines’ fuel 
injection systems were operated by computer software, which was pro-
grammed to operate differently at highway speeds than the standardized 
conditions of emissions testing.24 This improved the fuel economy of the 
engines but caused them to emit nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) at levels above the 
legal limit.25 The Government argued that the purpose of the fraudulent fuel 
injection system was “to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative” the engines’ 
emissions control system.26 The fuel injection system therefore violated the 
Clean Air Act as a “prohibited defeat device.”27 
Although the manufacturers denied that their systems used prohibited 
defeat devices, after nearly a year of negotiations the manufacturers agreed 
to enter into a series of consent decrees with the United States.28 Under the 
decrees, the manufacturers were required to meet new emissions standards 
for heavy-duty diesel engines before the standards took general effect.29 The 
manufacturers also agreed to a provision called the “non-road pull-ahead,” 
which accelerated the implementation of stricter emissions standards for 
non-road compression-ignition engines.30 
Volvo Truck Corporation (“Volvo Truck”) entered into one of these 
consent decrees in 1998.31 As part of a 2001 Volvo corporate restructuring, 
Volvo Powertrain Corp. acquired production facilities from Volvo Truck, 
and assumed Volvo Truck’s responsibilities under the consent decree.32 
Shortly thereafter, Volvo Powertrain’s facility in Skövde, Sweden com-
menced production of non-road engines for Volvo Penta, a corporate subsid-
iary.33 
In 2005, Volvo Penta requested the EPA certify that exhaust from eleven 
engine models manufactured at the Skövde facility conform with the emis-
sions standards for model year 2005 non-road engines.34 The EPA requires 
                                                                                                                           
 23 United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp. (Volvo I), 854 F. Supp. 2d 60, 63 (D.D.C. 2012), 
aff’d, 758 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
 27 Volvo I, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 63. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. The decrees signed by different manufacturers were similar to one another and ensured 
that no manufacturer would gain a competitive advantage over the others. Id. 
 30 Id. The non-road engines had not been a part of the alleged violation, but were included in the 
consent decrees in an attempt to further reduce the levels of atmospheric air pollution. Id. at 64. EPA 
literature indicates that a significant amount of air pollution stems from non-road engines and non-
road vehicles. HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
 31 Volvo I, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 63. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 63–64. As part of the non-road pull ahead, non-road engines in 2005 should have 
complied with the 2006 EPA emissions targets. See id. at 63. 
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this certification in order to sell an engine in the United States.35 After testing, 
the EPA issued certificates of compliance.36 Thereafter, Volvo’s competitor 
Caterpillar Inc., suggested to the Government that under the consent decree, 
Volvo Penta engines needed to conform to the more stringent model year 
2006 standards via the non-road pull-ahead.37 In July 2008, the Government 
issued a letter alleging that Volvo Powertrain had violated its consent decree 
and demanded penalties of approximately seventy-two million dollars.38 Vol-
vo Powertrain denied the allegations, and after attempting to resolve the dis-
pute, petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
for review.39 
When the parties entered into the consent decree in 1998, the District 
Court retained jurisdiction to resolve future disputes.40 The District Court 
held that the consent decree governed all non-road engines produced by Vol-
vo Powertrain and its corporate subsidiaries.41 However, since the consent 
decree was between Volvo Truck and the Government, and not Volvo Power-
train and the Government, the District Court held that it had discretion to 
grant equitable relief for violation of the decree.42 Using the penalty provision 
in the consent decree as guidance, the court calculated that Volvo Powertrain 
would owe $65,759,212 in stipulated penalties under the formula, in addition 
to $6,247,125 in interest, creating a total payment due of $72,006,337.43 
Volvo Powertrain appealed the court’s judgment to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the consent decree did 
not apply to the Volvo Penta engines even though the engines were manu-
factured “at a facility owned or operated by” Volvo Powertrain.44 The D.C. 
Circuit agreed with the lower court, citing that the consent decree imposed 
liability on Volvo Powertrain for its affiliates’ and subsidiaries’ engines.45 In 
addition, the D.C. Circuit stated that there had been no abuse of the equita-
ble discretion of the lower court in determining the financial remedy.46 
While claiming that none of the engines in question were subject to the 
consent decree, Volvo Powertrain argued in the alternative that at most it 
should face liability for those engines actually imported into the United 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Volvo I, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 63–64; see 40 C.F.R. § 89.105 (2016). 
 36 Volvo I, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 64. 
 37 United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp (Volvo II), 758 F.3d 330, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 38 Volvo I, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 64. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 65. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 73. 
 44Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 334 (referring to the specific language of the consent decree). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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States.47 The D.C. Circuit determined that regardless of whether any of the 
engines actually entered the United States, the 8354 engines met the criteri-
on of a compression ignition engine and held that Volvo Powertrain subject-
ed itself to United States jurisdiction by seeking certificates of compli-
ance.48 The court’s conclusion avoided confronting any issues of extraterri-
toriality..49 
Volvo Powertrain also argued that that the consent decree’s stipulated 
penalty provision does not apply when an entity not specifically named 
seeks a certificate of conformity.50 The D.C. Circuit, unpersuaded by this 
rationale, upheld the lower court’s remedy as an exercise of its equitable 
discretion.51 In Federal Trade Commission v. Trudeau, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a district court must explain and support its cal-
culation method when exercising equitable discretion to determine a finan-
cial penalty.52 Applying this persuasive authority, the D.C. Circuit decided 
that the lower court had sufficiently explained its calculation.53  
The court further pointed to the fact that the penalty imposed by the 
lower court was in line with a penalty previously paid by Caterpillar for simi-
lar violations.54 Volvo Powertrain tried to distinguish itself from Caterpillar, 
claiming that Caterpillar consciously certified engines in violation of the con-
sent decree, while Volvo Powertrain was unsure of the requirements of the 
consent decree.55 The D.C. Circuit was not swayed by this argument and in-
stead reasoned that Volvo Powertrain could have asked the District Court for 
a ruling to determine if the engines manufactured by Volvo Penta were bound 
by the consent decree, instead of assuming that the decree did not apply.56 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
administrator must set standards for emissions of air pollutants from en-
gines if the emissions create or exacerbate air pollution that jeopardizes 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Id. at 341. 
 48 Id. at 341–42. 
 49 Id. at 342. 
 50 Id. at 343. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Trudeau, 579 F.3d 754, 772 (7th Cir. 2009). The penalty must be “a 
reasonable approximation of losses, gains, or some other measure the court finds appropriate.” Id. at 
773. 
 53 Volvo II, 758 F.3d. at 343. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id.  
 56 See id. at 344–45. 
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human health and the environment.57 Provisions of the Clean Air Act regu-
late hydrocarbon, carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, and particulate mat-
ter emissions from engines.58 Violations of the Clean Air Act were the rea-
son why Volvo, and other companies, entered into the consent decrees in 
1998.59 
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit looked to prior 
case precedent for guidance on interpreting and applying the consent de-
cree.60 In Segar v. Mukasey, the court held that the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration engaged in discriminatory employment practices and entered 
into a series of stipulations to resolve the matter.61 In response to a chal-
lenge to the enforceability of the stipulations, the Mukasey court reasoned 
that the stipulations were equivalent to a consent decree, and determined 
that the provisions were unambiguous and enforceable.62 In their analysis, 
the Mukasey court held that the consent decree was essentially a contract, 
and that the general principles of contract law and interpretation applied.63 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also relied 
on Cook v. City of Chicago for guidance.64 In Cook, an employee sought 
damages for the city of Chicago’s violation of a consent decree established 
after a civil rights action.65 The employee had been given a preference in 
future hiring for a director position, and the consent decree required the city 
to notify her of any directorship vacancies.66 After the city failed to comply 
with the conditions set by the decree, the court awarded Mrs. Cook back 
wages, and because the consent decree did not stipulate consequences of the 
breach, the court used its equitable discretion to award Mrs. Cook damag-
es.67 Cook ultimately held that if the consequences of breaching a consent 
decree are not outlined, a court has equitable discretion to fashion a remedy 
for violation.68 
In addition, the D.C. Circuit looked to other cases to assist in its inter-
pretation of the consent decree in question in United States v. Volvo Power-
                                                                                                                           
 57 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2012); see United States v. Volvo Powertrain 
Corp. (Volvo II), 758 F.3d 330, 330 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 58 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i); see Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 335. 
 59 See Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 335. 
 60 Id. at 344–45 (citing Segar v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 16, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 61 508 F.3d at 17–18. 
 62 Id. at 18, 21. 
 63 Id. at 21–22. 
 64 See 758 F.3d at 343 (citing Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 65 192 F.3d at 694. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 698. 
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train Corp..69 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
previously held in Federal Trade Commission v. Trudeau that a district 
court must document its records and explain its rationale in selecting a cal-
culation method when imposing a monetary penalty.70 The penalty must be 
“a reasonable approximation of losses, gains, or some other measure the 
court finds appropriate.”71 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit ordered financial penalties for violating a con-
sent decree in United States v. Caterpillar, Inc.72 The consent decree, and 
subsequent infractions, stemmed from violations of the Clean Air Act.73 
That court determined the monetary penalty by using the stipulated penalty 
formula described in the consent decree.74 
III. ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately issued four im-
portant holdings.75 The court rejected Volvo Powertrain’s request to apply 
contempt standards to determine if a violation of the consent decree oc-
curred.76 The D.C. Circuit declined to apply that standard, citing that the 
standard would not have a meaningful effect on the outcome of the case.77 
The court then focused on reviewing the District Court’s interpretation 
of the consent decree according to the principles of contract law.78 The court 
examined how a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have 
interpreted the consent decree.79 It quoted the language of the consent decree: 
all heavy-duty diesel and non-road compression-ignition engines 
“manufactured at any facility owned or operated by VTC on or 
after January 1, 1998, for which a Certificate of Conformity is 
sought, must meet all applicable requirements of this Decree, re-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Trudeau, 579 F.3d at 773; United States v. Caterpillar Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 73, 90 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
 70 579 F.3d at 773. 
 71 Id. 
 72 227 F. Supp. 2d at 90. 
 73 Id. at 77 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1) (2012)). 
 74 See id. at 86–89. 
 75 See 758 F.3d 330, 338–46 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 76 Id. at 337–38. The contempt standard requires “clear and convincing evidence” to demon-
strate that a consent decree provision was violated. Id. at 338. 
 77 Id. The court reasoned that “clear and convincing evidence” requirement of the contempt 
standard would be irrelevant in this case because there is no question as to the number of engines 
manufactured, or the fact that the engines failed to meet emissions requirements. Id. 
 78 Id. at 339. 
 79 Id. 
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gardless of whether VTC still owned, owns, operated, or operates 
that facility at the time the engine is manufactured.”80 
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that since Volvo Powertrain is the successor to 
Volvo Truck Corp., it must follow that the Volvo Penta engines were indeed 
manufactured at a facility owned and operated by Volvo Powertrain.81 There-
fore, the engines were subject to all the requirements of the consent decree.82 
The D.C. Circuit also held that there was no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court’s equitable remedy for damages stemming from Volvo 
Powertrain’s violation of the consent decree.83 Finally, the court dismissed 
Volvo Powertrain’s argument that it should not be held liable for interest 
that accrued before the issuance of the written demand for penalties.84 The 
D.C. Circuit reasoned that since Volvo Powertrain did not question the in-
terest payment during the informal dispute resolution negotiations, Volvo 
Powertrain failed to preserve its right to challenge the interest payment in 
the courts.85 
On its face, Volvo Powertrain Corp. appears to be an expansion of the 
regulatory power of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).86 Volvo 
Powertrain was forced to pay civil penalties for engines that were never 
offered for sale, sold, or imported within the borders of the United States.87 
The EPA’s grant of authority from Congress does not confer to the EPA the 
ability to enforce United States emissions standards on engines that never 
enter the United States88 Similarly, the Clean Air Act cannot impose penal-
ties on parties in violation of its provisions abroad.89 In addition, the con-
sent decree contains no language stating that Volvo Powertrain agreed to the 
EPA’s exercise of extraterritorial enforcement.90 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. As noted previously, the corporate structure of Volvo Truck Corp changed shortly after 
entering the consent decree. Id. at 336. Volvo Powertrain and Volvo Construction became parties 
to the consent decree, and Volvo Penta remained a subsidiary of Volvo Powertrain. Id. 
 82 Id. at 340. 
 83 Id. at 334. The D.C. Circuit found that the consent decree’s stipulated penalty provision 
was sufficiently clear and was an appropriate tool to determine penalty payments for Volvo 
Powertrain.  Id. at 345. 
 84 Id. at 345–46. 
 85 Id. at 346. 
 86 Id. at 334 (finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Volvo 
Powertrain to pay a financial penalty stemming from violation of the consent decree). 
 87 See id. at 341. 
 88 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012); Final Principal Brief for Appellant at 40, Volvo II, 758 
F.3d 330 (No. 12-5234), 2013 WL 2446138. 
 89 See Final Principal Brief for Appellant, supra note 88 at 20, 40. The Clean Air Act does not 
explicitly allow for extraterritorial enforcement of the United States’ environmental policies. See 42 
U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1); Final Principal Brief for the Appellant, supra note 88 at 20, 40. 
 90 See Final Principal Brief for Appellant, supra note 88 at 40–41. 
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These claims persuasively argue that the federal government was over-
reaching by trying to enforce the consent decree.91 Nevertheless, the D.C. 
Circuit correctly dismissed these arguments because Volvo Penta sought 
certificates of compliance for the 3456 engines it manufactured that model 
year.92 EPA compliance regulations apply to all engines for which a manu-
facturer seeks a certificate of conformity, regardless of whether the engines 
are ever imported and sold in the United States93 Thus, the D.C. Circuit cor-
rectly ruled that by requesting a certificate of conformity, Volvo Penta sub-
jected itself to United States jurisdiction and the engines were subject to the 
requirements of the EPA.94 
Volvo Powertrain Corp is a decision rooted in the facts of the specific 
case.95 Volvo Penta had no obligation to seek EPA certificates of conformity 
for the engines at issue in the instant case.96 As such, Volvo Powertrain 
would not be in violation of the consent decree if Volvo Penta declined to 
seek these certificates.97 Furthermore, the consent decree’s non-road pull 
ahead advances the principal goals of the Clean Air Act by accelerating 
emissions reductions.98 An EPA certificate of conformity allows an engine 
to be sold or imported into the United States.99 Once issued, it is unlikely 
that either the manufacturer or the Government could track the location and 
use of each engine.100 Thus, in order to ensure that all Volvo Powertrain en-
gines potentially entering the U.S. met the appropriate requirements, it was 
necessary for the consent decree to be linked to the submission of a request 
for a certificate of conformity.101 
Opponents to the court’s ruling in Volvo Powertrain Corp. warned in 
an amicus brief that corporations will now be hesitant to enter into consent 
decrees as they are unsure of their possible interpretations and global 
reach.102 Some amici argued that the ruling will be deleterious to the usage 
of consent decrees in environmental enforcement actions, as fears of finan-
cial uncertainty surrounding the decrees could lead to alternative settle-
                                                                                                                           
 91 See id. 
 92 See Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 342–43. 
 93 See id.; 40 C.F.R §§ 89.115(d), 89.117 (2016). 
 94 See Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 342–43; 40 C.F.R § 89.115(a). 
 95 See Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 343. 
 96 See id. at 342–43. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012); Brief for the United States in Opposition at 16, Volvo 
II, 758 F.3d 330 (No. 14-748), 2015 WL 2170431. 
 99 See Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 98, at 16. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See id. at 17. 
 102 Brief of Amici Curiae The National Association of Manufacturers et al., in Support of 
Defendant-Appellant at 3–4, Volvo II, 758 F.3d 330 (No. 12-5234), 2012 WL 6636399.  
2017] Extraterritorial Enforcement of an EPA Consent Decree 205 
ments.103 These fears do not reflect that the holding of Volvo Powertrain 
Corp. is closely linked to the specific facts in the case.104 Volvo Powertrain 
subjected itself to United States jurisdiction by seeking the EPA certificates 
of compliance, thus triggering the violation of the consent decree.105 While 
critics of the decision may claim government agency overreach, the holding 
is cabined to the specific facts and circumstances of the case.106 Neverthe-
less, the holding of Volvo Powertrain Corp. should put businesses on notice 
as to the type of activities that could trigger enforcement of a consent de-
cree provision.107 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia cor-
rectly upheld the District Court’s interpretation and application of the con-
sent decree between Volvo Powertrain Corporation and the Government. On 
the surface, United States. v. Volvo Powertrain Corp. appears to be an over-
reach by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), using the Clean Air 
Act as a vehicle to promote U.S. environmental policies abroad. After close 
examination of the D.C. Circuit’s holdings, it is clear that Volvo Powertrain 
subjected itself to U.S. jurisdiction by requesting certificates of compliance 
from the EPA for the non-road compression-ignition engines manufactured 
at the Volvo Penta facility. Volvo Powertrain Corp. sends a clear message to 
corporations to clearly understand the scope and reach of the consent de-
crees that they enter into. 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See id. at 3. 
 104 See Volvo II, 758 F.3d at 343. 
 105 See id. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. 
  
 
 
